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OPEN SPACE PRESERVATION AND ACQUISITION ALONG
ILLINOIS WATERWAYS
MARGIT LIVINGSTON*
Throughout the past decade, as the work week has shrunk and per
capita income has risen, Americans have found themselves with more
and more leisure time.' In Illinois, specifically, demand for outdoor
recreational activities will increase by almost eighty percent between
1970 and 1985-an increase of more than five times the population
growth for the same period.
2
Although the demand for recreational facilities is growing rapidly,
the State of Illinois is lacking in public recreational and park areas.
3
The crisis in the availability of open space and recreational facilities is
most acute in the urban areas in Illinois, and it is predicted that unless
an affirmative program is undertaken to meet the rising demand for
parks and natural areas, the crisis will worsen.4 This shortage will af-
fect a large number of the state's residents. According to the 1970 cen-
sus, eighty-three percent of Illinois' population is urban-that is, living
in municipalities of 2,500 or more inhabitants.5
Many local governments will be faced with the responsibility of
upgrading the parks and conserving scenic areas within their jurisdic-
tions. Although both the state6 and federal7 governments have open
* Assistant Professor, DePaul University School of Law; B.A., Flugsburg College; J.D.,
University of Minnesota; LL.M., University of Illinois.
1. TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZEN'S
POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 79-80 (1973). Because of increasing energy shortages, one
may question whether the high level of affluence and long-distance recreational trips that Ameri-
cans currently enjoy will continue for many more years. Demand for recreational facilities close
to populous urban areas, however, should increase as Americans use their automobiles less fre-
quently for vacations.
2. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, ILLINOIS OUTDOOR RECREATION 62-65
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ILLINOIS OUTDOOR RECREATION].
3. Although Illinois is the fifth most populous state in the nation, it is ranked forty-ninth in
state park land per capita. Reclassfcation Would Sharply Reduce Illinois State Parks, SIERRA
CLUB LAKE & PRAIRIE I (Feb.-Mar. 1979).
4. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION ANNUAL REPORT 14 (Feb. 1975). The
department estimated that local governments in Illinois currently need 200,000 additional acres of
open space, "yet each year, in the Chicago area alone, potential parklands equivalent to the size of
the city of Joliet are converted to urban uses." Id
5. ILLINOIS OUTDOOR RECREATION, supra note 2, at 24.
6. Eg., the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. § 4601-4 to 460/-11
(1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-422, 101, 90 Stat. 1313 (1976) provides for the acquisition of
lands for federally administered recreation areas and matching grants for state recreation plan-
ning and state and local land acquisition and development for recreation purposes.
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space acquisition programs and other statutory schemes to improve rec-
reational opportunities, many of these programs are focused on large
rural or semirural areas suitable for federal, state, or regional parks.
The cities and park districts are left to provide recreational areas closer
to the urban core, the need for which will increase as gasoline supplies
become scarce.8
Illinois is fortunate in having numerous rivers and streams, 9 many
of which flow through metropolitan areas.' 0 These waterways are nat-
ural focal points for comprehensive local park and open space pro-
grams. Water and the adjacent land permit the widest range of
recreational opportunities of perhaps any area within a city." Among
all recreational activities, the demand for water-based pursuits such as
swimming, boating, and fishing is expected to increase the most over
the next few years.12 In addition, waterways have great aesthetic value,
and the creation of a linear parkway along a waterway can serve to
rejuvenate a downtown business area.
13
In light of these considerations, this article will explore the legal
aspects of the acquisition and preservation by Illinois local govern-
ments of water-based recreational and scenic areas. Generally, two
purposes will motivate a local government to undertake a waterway
project: the desire to preserve unspoiled streams in urban fringe areas
and the desire to beautify urbanized streams and develop their recrea-
7. E.g., the Capital Development Bond Act of 1972, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 751 (1977),
permits issuance of bonds by the state for the acquisition and construction of facilities, including
land and buildings, for open space and recreational and conservation purposes.
8. The Illinois Department of Conservation views local governments as the most appropri-
ate bodies to serve the urban population's open space and recreational needs, in particular the
needs of low-income persons who are likely to seek leisure activities close to home. ILLINOIS
OUTDOOR RECREATION, supra note 2, at x, 130.
9. Illinois is bordered by three major rivers, the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Wabash, and
has a total of 9,352 miles of rivers and streams within its borders. Id at 3-4.
10. For example, the Chicago River in Chicago, the Rock River in Rockford, the Sangamon
River in Springfield, the Kankakee River in Kankakee, and Boneyard Creek in Champaign-
Urbana flow through urban areas.
11. C. LITTLE, CHALLENGE OF THE LAND: OPEN SPACE PRESERVATION AT THE LOCAL
LEVEL 17 (1968). The Illinois Technical Advisory Committee on Water Resources has recom-
mended that the highest priority for any open space/recreational land acquisition program should
be to increase public access to waterways. ILLINOIS TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
WATER RESOURCES, WATER FOR ILLINOIS: A PLAN FOR ACTION 384 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
WATER FOR ILLINOIS].
12. Between 1970 and 1985, the demand for water-based recreational activities is expected to
increase 107 percent. ILLINOIS OUTDOOR RECREATION, supra note 2, at 65.
13. For example, the San Antonio River Walk, which consists of parks and attractive cafes
and shops bordering the San Antonio River, has revitalized the downtown commercial district and
drawn tourists into the city. C. GUNN, D. REED & R. COUCH, CULTURAL BENEFITS FROM MET-
ROPOLITAN RIVER RECREATION-SAN ANTONIO PROTOTYPE 7-14 (1972).
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tional potential.' 4 Both purposes will be considered in the analysis of
legal constraints.
Several issues associated with acquiring and preserving land along
an urban stream will be examined. First, this article will review the
various methods by which a unit of local government can obtain open
space adjacent to a waterway. Second, the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each of these methods will be discussed in light of the commu-
nity's goals, the cost, and the constraints under Illinois law. Finally, the
outlines of an open space acquisition/preservation program that a local
governmental body initiatingan urban stream project might follow will
be described. There will be no attempt to suggest all the possible com-
binations of open space acquisition techniques, but a broad plan of ac-
tion will be delineated.
Three general categories of means by which a public body can pre-
serve or acquire park land or scenic areas also will be discussed: (1)
regulation, which includes zoning, compensable regulation, and subdi-
vision regulation; (2) acquisition, which consists of purchase and con-
demnation; and, (3) donation, dedication, and prescriptive rights. The
first two categories are usually initiated by governments, although pri-
vate groups also purchase open lands. 15 Private individuals most often
instigate and control the third category of methods, sometimes en-
couraged by state and local agencies.' 6
REGULATION
State governments may exercise their inherent police power to reg-
ulate an activity for the public health, welfare, safety, and morals. The
state may delegate this power to local governments, which would other-
wise not have it. 7 Generally, in regulating a certain activity, the gov-
14. Parks along waterways provide recreational opportunities in themselves, as well as access
points to the water and places to build boating facilities. In Illinois, the public has an easement of
navigation in navigable waterways. Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 75 N.E. 783 (1905); Braxon v.
Bressler, 64 Ill. 488, 491-92 (1872); City of Chicago v. McGinn, 51 111. 266, 271-72 (1869). The
easement arguably includes not only the right of commercial navigation, but also the right to use
the water for pleasure boating, fishing, swimming, and wading. See Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Chi-
cago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976). The public navigational easement by itself,
however, does not permit members of the public to cross private land to reach the water. See
generally Livingston, Public Recreational Rights in Illinois Rivers and Streams, 29 DEPAUtL L. REV.
353 (1980).
15. For example, the Nature Conservancy and the Natural Land Institute were formed to
acquire natural areas by gift or purchase. In 1975, the Illinois branch of the Nature Conservancy
acquired land in Illinois worth $2 million.
16. See text accompanying notes 138-76 infra.
17. The exception to this rule in Illinois is home rule units which, under the Illinois Constitu-
tion, "may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs
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ernment is not required to compensate individuals who may be injured
in some way by the regulation. However, in the land use area, a type of
compensable regulation in which the individuals harmed would be re-
imbursed for a part of their loss has been advocated as a means of
avoiding constitutional infirmities.' 8 This section will examine the
value, as open space preservation methods, of the traditional kinds of
land use control, zoning, and subdivision regulation and also will touch
upon the potential usefulness with regard to this area of innovative
compensable regulations.
Zoning
Zoning is the classic land use regulatory device, and in Illinois
both municipalities' 9 and counties20 have zoning powers. There are
several types of zoning that may be used by the open space planner:
flood plain zoning, conservation zoning, minimum lot size zoning, clus-
ter zoning, and interim zoning. A local government sponsoring an
urban stream project may use one or several different types in combi-
nation to preserve open riverfront lands.
Although not expressly aimed at providing greenbelts and con-
serving scenic areas, flood plain zoning may have the incidental effect
of opening up land along waterways.2' Apart from the desire to pre-
serve open space, state and local governments generally have a strong
incentive to pass flood plain zoning ordinances provided by the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program legislation. 22 To qualify for federal
assistance under this program, an area must have adequate land use
measures in effect that meet federal criteria. 23 In Illinois, this type of
zoning is particularly important because an unusually high percentage
of the state's land is subject to flooding.24 In urban areas, the encroach-
ment of buildings on riparian lands increases the damage caused by
including . . . the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare ...." ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 6(a).
18. See text accompanying notes 81-89 infra.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-13-1 to 11-13-19 (1977). Home rule' municipalities derive
their zoning powers from the Illinois Constitution. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(a). See also Cain v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 574, 325 N.E.2d 799 (1975); Johnny Bruce Co.
v. City of Champaign, 24 I11. App. 3d 900, 321 N.E.2d 469 (1974).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 3151-3162 (1977).
21. E. SMITH & D. RIGGS, LAND USE, OPEN SPACE, AND THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS: THE
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA EXPERIENCE 45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LAND USE].
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1977).
23. Id. §§ 4002(b)(3), 4022, 4102.
24. The percentage of land area in Illinois subject to flooding is eleven percent, twice the
national average. WATER FOR ILLINOIS, supra note 11, at 248.
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flooding both near the built-up areas and further downstream. 25 Based
on studies of the 100-year flood pattern,26 flood plain regulations con-
sist of not only zoning but also building and locational restrictions.
27
Flood plain zoning ordinances as such generally classify areas within
the flood plain in a separate use district and permit only open space or
very low density uses. 28 Although zoning to inhibit flood damage is
generally considered a proper purpose of zoning, courts have not al-
ways upheld flood plain zoning ordinances if the land restricted has
development potential.
29
Conservation zoning serves to preserve areas of unusual historic,
scenic, recreational, or agricultural value by severely limiting the type
of structures that can be built in such areas. Conservation zoning may
involve the creation of conservation districts, designated areas in which
no property may be developed except in accordance with the restric-
tions specified in the ordinance. On the other hand, a conservation
zoning ordinance may delineate a conservation zone, similar to a com-
mercial or residential zone, which may be applied to any given parcel
which has unusual scenic or historic value. Some ordinances provide
for both conservation or historic districts and a conservation zoning
designation that may be applied to individual tracts not in a conserva-
tion district.30 However, unless the area has not yet been developed,
conservation zoning has little utility. Thus, in urban communities, a
25. Although large scale floods occur on Illinois' major rivers, the greater part of the annual
flood damage results from the numerous floods on smaller streams. Id at 239, 242.
26. LAND USE, supra note 21, at 45-46.
27. Municipal and state building codes usually require the property owner to raise the
ground and building levels above the high water mark before any structures are erected. Loca-
tional requirements prohibit structures within a specified distance from the stream corresponding
to the floodway. Eg., KANKAKEE MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 14 -8 to 14 -12 (1972); ROCKFORD MU-
NICIPAL CODE § 11 -I (1970).
28. Another type of flood plain zoning ordinance disallows all but those uses that would
suffer minimal flood damage such as parking lots, fairgrounds, drive-in theaters, and parks. LAND
USE, supra note 21, at 45-46.
29. In one Illinois case, the appellate court invalidated a flood plain zoning ordinance that
classified plaintiffs' riverfront property as single family residential. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Village of Winfield, 1 111. App. 3d 376, 274 N.E.2d 144 (1971). The court implicitly ac-
cepted flood plain regulations as a proper exercise of the police power but said that in this instance
the plaintiffs' proposed use of the property as the site for an apartment building was at least as
compatible with preserving the flood plain, if not more so, than a single family residence. Plain-
tiffs' expert witness testified that plaintiffs' building plans for the parcel would preserve the flood
plain area. In dictum, the court noted that although maintaining the property in its "natural"
condition would no doubt benefit the public, the plaintiffs could not be singled out to bear the cost
of such preservation. The city in that situation should condemn the property and compensate the
owner. Id at 379, 274 N.E.2d at 195-96.
30. The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, for example, allows the Landmarks
Commission to designate individual buildings and parcels of special historic value as "landmarks"
or "landmark sites" and to denote entire neighborhoods as "historic districts." NEW YORK CITY
CHARTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976).
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stream that is bordered on both sides by buildings could not quickly be
restored to recreational use through a conservation zoning ordinance.
The ordinance could prohibit any change to any existing buildings or
any construction of additional buildings. However, it could not require
landowners to remove the existing structures,31 and thus the noncon-
forming uses would persist for several years. Conservation zoning
would therefore be more useful in a suburban area where the land ad-
jacent to a waterway has not been developed.
A third kind of zoning, minimum lot size zoning, requires develop-
ers to build houses on lots of a certain minimum acreage. This type of
ordinance is usually coupled with a requirement that the houses be sin-
gle family dwellings rather than duplexes or apartment buildings. Like
conservation zoning, minimum lot size zoning has its greatest value as
an open space preservation device in developing suburban communi-
ties. But it is less useful in preserving open space along streams than
conservation zoning because it tends to produce blocks of evenly
spaced houses on parcels having no public access rather than open
lands suitable for recreation or aesthetic enjoyment.
32
On the other hand, when large lot zoning is combined with cluster
zoning, it can aid in the preservation of open space along waterways.
Cluster zoning permits developers to avoid minimum lot size require-
ments and to place houses on the land that they are subdividing ac-
cording to its topography. Houses may be located closer together than
would normally be permitted under the minimum lot size ordinance so
long as the overall density remains the same as it would have been
under the ordinance. Developers are thus encouraged to cluster the
houses on the portion of their land most suited to construction and to
leave open the rougher terrain, which is often adjacent to lakes or
streams. 3
3
In order to accomplish its goal of preserving and acquiring open
31. The right to continue a nonconforming use is considered a property right in Illinois which
cannot be taken away from the owner by an unreasonable ordinance not grounded in the public
welfare. An ordinance which required immediate removal of all commercial and residential
structures from parcels so that open space would be created would no doubt be considered unrea-
sonable. A reasonable period of amortization should be allowed. See Brown v. Gerhardt, 5 Ill. 2d
106, 110, 125 N.E.2d 53, 56 (1955); Sanderson v. DeKalb County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 24 I11.
App. 3d 107, 110, 320 N.E.2d 54, 56-57 (1976); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Village of Oak Brook, 15
Ill. App. 3d 424, 428, 304 N.E.2d 460, 463 (1973).
32. See Moore, The Acquisition and Preservation of Open Lands, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
274, 286-89 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Moore]; Schroeder, Preservation and Control of Open Space
in Metropolitan Areas, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 345, 352-53 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder].
33. See LAND USE, mupra note 21, at 46-48; Herring, Better Use of Old Tools-Are New Tools
Necessary? in OPEN SPACE AND THE LAW 99-100 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Herring]; Schroeder,
supra note 32, at 353-54.
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space along an urban waterway, a municipality may need to employ
one additional type of zoning while it is preparing the open space ele-
ment of its urban stream plan-interim zoning. Interim zoning ordi-
nances prohibit any change in the existing uses or property within a
specified district for a certain period of time.34 During the resulting
development "freeze," the municipality gains the necessary time to
consider various methods to open up the stream and its banks to public
use and does not have to worry that the land that is being considered
for a park will be filled with an apartment building.
The primary advantage of zoning as an open space preservation
technique is that it is probably the least expensive of the various tech-
niques. A municipality or county expends none of its funds in passing
a conservation district zoning ordinance. In addition, the land remains
in private ownership and thus on the property tax rolls.35 Moreover,
zoning restrictions can cover a wide area, and hence a strip of land on
either side of an urban or suburban waterway could be barred from
further development with virtually no cost to the public.
36
Open space zoning, however, has a number of serious deficiencies.
It is questionable, for example, whether a landowner could be required
by a zoning ordinance to allow public access to his property.37 Hence,
a conservation zoning ordinance can prohibit building on flood plains
and can preserve a scenic view next to an urban river, but it cannot
34. One Illinois community, Champaign-Urbana, has embarked on an urban stream beauti-
fication project. Still in the planning stage, the two cities enacted a moratorium ordinance to halt
construction of buildings along the stream, Boneyard Creek. The original moratorium ordinance,
which prohibited new construction within a seventy-five foot corridor along the stream, was en-
acted for an initial six month period and was subsequently renewed for an additional six months.
A revised, less restrictive ordinance was then enacted requiring setbacks of varying distances
along the stream in accordance with a master plan for the development. This ordinance remained
in effect until December 31, 1979. Interview with Kurt Froelich, Champaign City Attorney (July
18, 1979).
The courts have had mixed reactions to this type of regulation. See, e.g., Meadowland Re-
gional Dev. Agency v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 119 N.J. Super. 572, 293 A.2d
192 (1972) (interim zoning ordinance "freezing" development of 10,000 acres of undeveloped land
for two-year period upheld); Home v. Board of Supervisors, No. 32309 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1974) (county
ordinance banning building of new subdivisions and residential or industrial complexes invali-
dated).
35. A highly restrictive zoning ordinance, however, may reduce the assessed valuation of a
piece of taxable property since it is assessed according to a percentage of its fair cash value, which
is equivalent to fair market value. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501(1) (1977). If the probability
of obtaining a rezoning was slight, the fair market value of the property undoubtedly would be
reduced over what it had been before the zoning ordinance was enacted.
36. The municipality also saves the cost of providing as much police and fire protection or as
many sewage treatment facilities, schools, and parks as it would for a developed parcel.
37. It is possible that the ordinance could require public access if the landowner were permit-
ted to charge fees. See Heyman, Open Space and Police Power, in OPEN SPACE AND THE LAW 13
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Police Power].
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create a public recreational area along the river.38
Another liability of zoning as an open space preservation tool
stems from its questionable statutory and constitutional status. A zon-
ing ordinance that classified the land bordering an urban stream in a
conservation district and allowed the owners to use their property only
for park purposes could be challenged on a number of legal grounds:
(1) that it violates substantive due process; (2) that it results in a confis-
cation or "taking" of individuals' property without just compensation;
and, (3) that it is ultra vires.
39
An unreasonable exercise of zoning powers by a governmental
body constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law
and thus violates the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution and article I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution. In Illinois,
there is a presumption in favor of the validity of a zoning ordinance as
a legislative enactment,4° and one attacking the ordinance has the bur-
den of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is arbitrary and
unreasonable. 4' If it is fairly debatable as to whether a particular ordi-
nance is reasonable, the courts will sustain the legislative judgment.42
In determining whether a zoning ordinance violates notions of
substantive due process, Illinois courts have examined whether the or-
dinance serves a legitimate governmental purpose, whether there is a
reasonable relation between the end sought and the means used to
achieve it, and whether the ordinance allows the property owner any
reasonable return from his property. Although traditionally in Illinois
an aesthetic purpose alone was insufficient to uphold a zoning ordi-
nance,43 more recently the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated a will-
ingness to sanction zoning for aesthetic purposes.44 Furthermore, the
38. In one New York case, a zoning ordinance which purported to zone certain land for park
use only and to provide public access to it was invalidated. See discussion of Fred F. French Inv.
Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381, appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 990 (1976), in text accompanying notes 51-54 infra.
39. See generall, Police Power, supra note 37, at 8-11. An open space ordinance should
survive an equal protection challenge if it covers the riverfront property. The court need find only
that this classification has a rational basis.
40. Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 30 Ill. App. 3d 918, 333 N.E.2d 513 (1975).
41. Reeve v. Village of Glenview, 29 I. 2d 611, 195 N.E.2d 188 (1963); Cohen v. City of Des
Plaines, 30 I11. App. 3d 918, 333 N.E.2d 513 (1975).
42. Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932); Rebman v. City of Springfield, 111
Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969); Avenue State Bank v. Village of Oak Park, 99 Ill. App. 2d
329, 241 N.E.2d 630 (1968).
43. Federal Electric Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 398 Ill. 142, 75 N.E.2d 359 (1947); State
Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Wilmette, 358 Ill. 311, 193 N.E. 131 (1934).
44. In one case, the Supreme Court upheld an Evanston ordinance that zoned plaintiffs
property for single family residential purposes. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Evanston, 57 I11. 2d
415, 312 N.E.2d 625 (1974). The court accepted as a valid justification for the ordinance the city's
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courts have sustained ordinances that, in addition to an aesthetic goal,
had some other purpose related to the public health, safety, welfare,
comfort, or morals.45 A conservation zoning ordinance that restricted
land along a waterway to open space and low density uses could be
justified on the basis that, in addition to preserving scenic areas, it re-
duced the threat of flood damage. Thus, if the ordinance is properly
drafted, then the municipality or county should be able to resist an
attack on the purpose of the ordinance.
46
Similarly, with careful drafting, the ordinance should withstand
the charge that there is no reasonable relation between the goal sought
and the means employed to attain it. If the provisions of the ordinance
specify that property adjacent to the stream may be used for purposes
compatible with its character as part of the flood plain but exclude
those uses that will increase substantially damage caused by flooding,
then the ordinance could not be deemed arbitrary. Normally, any
structure such as a house, apartment building, or parking lot will make
the area bordering a waterway more susceptible to flooding and will
also increase the flood damage downstream.
47
The largest hurdle in the due process area that the proponent of an
open space zoning ordinance will have to surmount is the assertion that
the ordinance deprives the owner of any reasonable return on his prop-
erty. This issue has been recognized as theoretically distinct from
whether an ordinance constitutes a "taking" or confiscation of property
without payment of just compensation. 48 In the face of charges that
goal of having lower structures and a smaller population near the lakefront and adjacent park
areas so that the recreational advantages and scenic attributes of the lakefront would be preserved.
The court suggested that an aesthetic purpose alone may be a purpose sufficient to .invoke the
police power:
[Tihere would appear to be significant authority that aesthetic factors may, in some in-
stances, be used as the sole basis to validate a zoning classification or be acknowledged
as a viable factor in zoning determinations. We are of the opinion that in the present
case aesthetic qualities are a properly cognizable feature ...
Id at 432-33, 312 N.E.2d at 634 (citations omitted).
45. Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 280, 43 N.E.2d 947, 950 (1942); Rebman v. City
of Springfield, I I Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969). See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954). There is no longer much question in Illinois that a zoning ordinance for the purpose of
preserving open riverfront lands would be held to have a legitimate purpose. The Zoning En-
abling Act was amended in 1971 to allow municipalities to zone to "facilitate the preservation of
sites, areas, and structures of historical, architectural and aesthetic importance." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (1977).
46. The Illinois Department of Local Government Affairs has prepared a useful compen-
dium of different types of flood plain regulations entitled GUIDES FOR FLOOD PLAIN REGULATION
(PMS 74-2, 1974). The report was prepared specifically to assist local units of government in
solving their flood plain problems.
47. WATER FOR ILLINOIS, supra note 11, at 242.
48. Different remedies also are invoked by the landowners whose property is affected by the
regulation. An overly broad zoning ordinance will be declared invalid whereas an owner whose
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ordinances deprived owners of any reasonable beneficial use of their
property, non-Illinois courts have upheld conservation zoning regula-
tions even where they allowed property owners only severely limited
open space uses.49 But, just as often, courts in other jurisdictions have
struck down such regulations.
50
I In one New York case, Fred F French Investment Co. v. City of
New York, 5I the court invalidated on due process grounds a New York
City ordinance that zoned plaintiffs' land for park purposes only and
required that plaintiffs allow public access for sixteen hours each day.
5 2
Plaintiffs had no possibility of realizing any reasonable economic re-
turn on their land, the court said, and the ordinance in effect deprived
the owner of all his property rights in the parcels except bare title and
the slim possibility of a future reversion of full use. 53 The court
deemed the option to transfer development rights to certain other par-
cels in Manhattan too abstract and speculative, given the administra-
tive contingencies, to afford the landowners any probability of a
recoupment of their economic loss on the park lands.54 This case
reveals the importance of careful drafting in creating a conservation
zoning ordinance: if the owners had been allowed some reasonable
beneficial use of their property or if the development rights transfer
property is confiscated or "taken" by government action may sue for inverse condemnation to
compel the government to pay just compensation for the property. For a discussion of the due
process/"taking" dichotomy see HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365,
542 P.2d 237 (1975); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976)
(dissenting opinion); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d
5, 350 N.E.2d 381, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Costonis, Fair Compensation and the
Accommodation Power. Ant/dolesfor the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1021 (1975); Comment, Urban Park Preservation Through Transferable Development
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1977).
49. Eg., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 542 P.2d 237
(1975); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
50. Eg., Maine v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co.
v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 233 (1963).
51. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
52. The ordinance permitted only "passive recreational uses" and improvements were re-
stricted to structures supportive of these uses. In addition, the parks were required to be open to
the public daily between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. 39 N.Y.2d at 592, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8, 350
N.E.2d at 384.
53. 39 N.Y.2d at 597, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11, 350 N.E.2d at 387.
54. The court viewed the floating development rights more as an ingenious "abstraction" of
the human imagination than a property interest of economic values:
[Slevered, the development rights are a double abstraction until they are actually at-
tached to a receiving parcel, yet to be identified, acquired, and subject to the contingent
future approvals of administrative agencies, events which may never happen because of
the exigencies of the market and the contingencies and exigencies of administrative ac-
tion.
Id. at 598, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11, 350 N.E.2d at 388.
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scheme had been worked out to remove the administrative contingen-
cies and uncertainties, the ordinance might have been upheld.
The Illinois courts have employed a type of balancing approach in
assessing zoning ordinances that reduce the value of an individual's
property. On the one hand, they have said that mere reduction in the
value of property is not sufficient to invalidate an ordinance 55 and that
diminished value is only one factor to be considered along with several
others.56 These other factors include the existing uses in the neighbor-
hood; the zoning of nearby property; the extent to which the ordinance
promotes the general health, safety, and welfare of the public; the rela-
tive gain to the public as compared to the hardship imposed upon the
individual property owner; the suitability of the particular property for
the purposes allowed under the ordinance; and the length of time that
the property has remained unused in light of the development pattern
in the area.57 Although some of the courts emphasize one or more of
these factors over the others, 58 most Illinois courts balance the public
gain against the private harm to determine the validity of an ordinance
as applied to a particular property owner. Thus, if a conservation zon-
ing ordinance prohibited all but open space uses in an area adjacent to
a rapidly developing community and if the parcels so zoned were ide-
ally suited for the construction of homes and other buildings, then the
court would probably not sustain it. However, property along a water-
way is not likely to be as suitable for development as parcels farther
inland because of the flooding problems. Moreover, if the ordinance
were to allow the owner some profitable use of his land, then it would
more probably be upheld.
The confiscation or "taking" issue, as was indicated earlier, is con-
ceptually separate from the substantive due process question. The lat-
ter revolves around whether a regulation is an overly broad exercise of
the police power, whereas the former arises from the constitutional
provisions 59 prohibiting the government from appropriating an owner's
55. Grobman v. City of Des Plaines, 59 Ill. 2d 588, 322 N.E.2d 443 (1975); Reeve v. Village
of Glenview, 29 Ill. 2d 611, 195 N.E.2d 188 (1963); Martin v. City of Rockford, 27 Ill. 2d 373, 189
N.E.2d 280 (1963).
56. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Evanston, 24 Ill. 2d 59, 179 N.E.2d 673 (1962); Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Village of Villa Park, 34 Ill. App. 3d 711, 340 N.E.2d 339 (1976); Kellett v.
County of Du Page, 89 Ill. App. 2d 437, 231 N.E.2d 706 (1967).
57. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 24 Ill. 2d 497, 182 N.E.2d 147 (1962); LaSalle
Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 12 IlI. 2d 40, 140 N.E.2d 65 (1957); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Village
of Harwood Heights, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 278 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
58. Reeve v. Village of Glenview, 29 Il. 2d 611, 195 N.E.2d 188 (1963) (character of the
neighborhood); Quilici v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 399 Ill. 418, 78 N.E.2d 240 (1948) (reduction in
property value).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
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property except for public use and upon payment of just compensation.
In contending that an open space ordinance constituted a "taking" of
his property, a landowner would sue for inverse condemnation and
seek to compel the local government to pay just compensation for the
land that it had appropriated. Courts generally have confused the
"taking" and due process issues, and many decisions have spoken of an
overly broad zoning ordinance as resulting in a "taking" of property
and thus have invalidated the ordinance. 60 Illinois courts have rarely
struck down zoning ordinances that diminished property values on the
basis that the government had in effect confiscated the property,61 al-
though courts in other jurisdictions have allowed inverse condemnation
actions in that situation.
62
It has been suggested that a zoning regulation should not be
deemed a "taking" except in rare circumstances where (1) the govern-
ment physically appropriates the property; (2) the regulation causes the
land to be physically invaded (e.g., by flood waters); or, (3) the ordi-
nance zones the land for public parks or buildings (except where the
landowner can make a profit by operating his land as a public recrea-
tion area). 63 The recent decision by the United States Supreme Court
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City64 indicates that
the Court is not ready to accept such a clean separation between the
due process and "taking" issues. In ruling on the validity of the New
York landmarks preservation law as applied to the Grand Central Ter-
minal,65 the Court discussed whether the regulation constituted a "tak-
60. The confusion stems originally from Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), in which he made the statement, often-quoted, that "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized a 'taking.'"
Id at 415.
61. See, e.g., Tews v. Woolhiser, 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 227 (1933).
62. Both federal and state courts in California have granted damages in inverse condemna-
tion actions to landowners whose property had been classified under a zoning ordinance as open
space or conservation lands. See Arastra Limited Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp.
962 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Eldridge v.
City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976); Gisler v. County of Madera, 38
Cal. App. 3d 303, 223 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974).
63. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 253-55 (1973). The authors
also comment on several other approaches to the taking issue. Id at 236-37.
64. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
65. Enacted pursuant to a state enabling act, the Landmarks Preservation Law was designed
to preserve historic neighborhoods and buildings in New York City. A Landmarks Preservation
Commission was created to identify landmarks and historic areas worthy of preservation. After a
hearing on a particular parcel, the commission could designate it as a landmark or historic district
if it was found to meet the ordinance's standards. The New York City Board of Estimates then
reviews the decision, and the property owner may seek additional judicial review.
Once his property achieves landmark status, the owner must keep it in good repair and is
prohibited from modifying the exterior architectural features of the landmark without the com-
mission's approval. Three procedures may be used to gain administrative approval. The owner
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ing" of the plaintiffs' property. It is clear, however, that the plaintiffs
were not seeking inverse condemnation of their property but a declara-
tion that the ordinance was invalid as applied to them. 66 Although the
Court ultimately sustained the ordinance for various reasons,
67 it sug-
gested that it would not limit the "taking" concept to those situations in
which the government took physical control over the property. 68 Thus
it seems that the "taking"/due process analysis will remain a kind of
amorphous hybrid and that although an Illinois court or the United
States Supreme Court may speak in terms of a "taking," it may then
proceed not to order inverse condemnation but only to invalidate the
ordinance. A municipality should be prepared then to meet both lines
of attack.
The additional importance of the Penn Central case for local gov-
ernments involved in open space planning is that the Court indicated
the types of factors which will sustain a preservation ordinance. The
Court found that although the ordinance required plaintiffs to maintain
the Grand Central Terminal as an historic landmark, it did not amount
to an interference with their property rights of such a magnitude that
compensation would be required to sustain it.69 Plaintiffs were allowed
to continue to use the property as a railroad terminal-housing offices
may seek a "certificate of no effect on protected architectural features" on the basis that the
change or improvement will not alter any architectural feature of the landmark. He may apply for
a certificate of "appropriateness" on the basis that the modification will not interfere unduly with
protection of the landmark's unique features. Finally, the owner may seek a certificate of appro-
priateness on the ground of "insufficient return" where he can demonstrate that the landmark
designation prevents him from realizing a reasonable return on his property.
In 1967, the commission designated the Grand Central Station terminal as a landmark. Penn
Central Transportation Company, owner of the terminal, later applied to the commission for ap-
proval to build an office building above the terminal. Both plans submitted by Penn Central were
rejected, and a certificate of appropriateness denied.
Penn Central and its lessee then filed suit in state court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief and damages for the "temporary taking" that occurred between the date that the property
was designated as a landmark and the date when the building restrictions were lifted. The trial
court granted declaratory and injunctive relief but severed the damages issue. On appeal, the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reversed and held that plaintiffs' property
had not been "taken" under the landmarks law since the evidence failed to establish that the
relation deprived them of all reasonable beneficial use of the property. Penn Central Trans. Corp.
v. New York City, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975). The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977).
66. Although plaintiffs did ask for damages for a "temporary taking," the main relief re-
quested was a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was constitutionally infirm as applied to
their property and an injunction prohibiting the city from using the Landmarks Preservation Law
to prevent them from building any structure that could otherwise lawfully be built. See 438 U.S.
at 119.
67. See text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
68. The Court stated, "As is implicit in our opinion, we do not embrace the proposition that a
'taking' can never occur unless Government has transferred physical control over a portion of a
parcel." 438 U.S. at 123 n.25.
69. Id at 135-38.
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and concessions-and, thus, the Court said, were able to realize a rea-
sonable return on their investment even without consideration of the
value of the parcel's unused development rights.70 Moreover, plaintiffs
could seek approval for new construction above the terminal from the
Landmarks Preservation Commission.71 Finally, the unused develop-
ment rights could be transferred to any of eight eligible parcels in the
vicinity.72 Applying these factors to an open space/park ordinance, a
municipality should permit compatible uses that allow property owners
to have some profitable activities on their land. Existing uses should be
allowed to continue for some period of time, and new construction con-
sonant with the open space preservation purposes should be subject to
the approval of the municipality in consultation with the city or re-
gional planning commission. If possible, the ordinance should permit
owners to transfer unused air rights to nearby parcels. This type of
ordinance will accommodate to some extent both the interests of the
public in riverfront open spaces and the reasonable expectations of pri-
vate property owners, who should not be required to shoulder an unfair
portion of the burden of providing for public park land.
In addition to substantive due process and confiscation arguments,
a third ground for invalidating a zoning ordinance is that it is ultra
vires, or beyond the limits of the enabling legislation. In Illinois, this
argument no longer exists with respect to home rule municipalities,
which are not bound by the provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act.73
Non-home rule municipalities, however, must still conform to those
limitations and are precluded from passing an ordinance that is not
reasonably related to the public health, safety, comfort, welfare, or
morals.74 Illinois courts have struck down without hesitation ordi-
nances that reduced property values but did not benefit the public
welfare.75 The courts might also invalidate as ultra vires any nontradi-
70. The New York Court of Appeals had rejected plaintiffs' assertion that their revenue state-
ments revealed that the terminal showed a net operating loss for the years 1969 and 1971, and
plaintiffs did not appeal that determination. Id at 119-22, 129.
71. Id at 136-37.
72. The Court noted that the transferability of development rights may not have constituted
"just compensation" if a "taking" had been found by it but that it did serve to soften the financial
strictures imposed by the landmarks law. Id at 137.
73. Cain v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 I11. App. 3d 574, 325 N.E.2d 799 (1975);
Johnny Bruce Co. v. City of Champaign, 24 Ill. App. 3d 900, 321 N.E.2d 469 (1974). A home rule
municipality may have zoning powers by virtue of both the Zoning Enabling Act and the constitu-
tional provisions regarding home rule. In enacting a type of zoning ordinance not specifically
authorized under the enabling statute, a municipality should consider declaring in the ordinance
that it is passing the regulation pursuant to its home rule powers. See Forrest, Improved Land Use
Regulationfor the Home Rule Munici'pa/ity, in HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS 101-06 (1973).
74. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 24 Ill. 2d 497, 182 N.E.2d 147 (1962).
75. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 140 N.E.2d 65 (1957); Cohen v. City
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tional type of zoning such as contract zoning.76 Thus, the municipality
depending upon an open space or flood plain zoning ordinance would
have to show both that it served the public welfare (which would prob-
ably be fairly easy to do) and that the particular type of zoning (e.g.,
cluster zoning, contract zoning) was authorized by the enabling stat-
ute.
77
Zoning's low cost as an open space preservation device must be
balanced against its questionable constitutionality and its inability to
provide public access to riverfront land without incurring judicial dis-
approval. Some of the constitutional problems may be overcome by
careful drafting and sympathetic courts. For example, instead of ban-
ning construction of any buildings along the riverfront, the city might
pass an ordinance allowing structures and designs that are compatible
with the flood plain area.78 The ordinance could require riverfront
owners to maintain the natural condition of a small strip immediately
adjacent to the waterway and to landscape the remaining developed
area.
Thus, zoning's most important function in open space preservation
may be to buy time for municipalities that currently lack funds to
purchase riverfront parcels. During the interim or moratorium period,
the city can seek out sources of funding and develop a long-range plan
for acquisition of selected parcels along the stream.79 But, again, a mu-
nicipality must tread lightly in this area because a court usually will not
hesitate to strike down an ordinance where it suspects that the ordi-
nance's purpose is to lower the property's value prior to condemna-
tion.80
of Des Plaines, 30 Ill. App. 3d 918, 333 N.E.2d 513 (1975); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Village of
Harwood Heights, 2 Il. App. 3d 1040, 278 N.E.2d 114 (1972).
76. Contract zoning involves the rezoning of a parcel by a municipality on the condition that
the property owner abide by certain restrictive covenants or additional restrictions on the use of
his property. This type of zoning has been held invalid in Illinois. See Cederberg v. City of
Rockford, 8 Ill. App. 3d 984, 291 N.E.2d 249 (1972).
77. Generally, the party attacking the ordinance has the burden of showing that the law is
arbitrary and unreasonable. However, Illinois cases indicate that the burden shifts to the propo-
nent of the ordinance to prove that it is reasonably related to the public health, safety, comfort,
morals, or welfare where the evidence shows the highest and best use of the property cannot be
made under the ordinance. See, e.g., DuPage Trust Co. v. City of Wheaton, 38 Ill. App. 3d 159,
347 N.E.2d 752 (1976); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Village of Villa Park, 34 Ill. App. 3d 711,
340 N.E.2d 239 (1976); Hoekstra v. City of Wheaton, 25 Ill. App. 3d 794, 323 N.E.2d 57 (1975).
78. Another method of overcoming constitutional problems, the use of compensable regula-
tions, will be discussed in the next section. See text accompanying notes 81-89 infra.
79. One commentator, however, has noted that even with a moratorium zoning ordinance,
much land will be irretrievably lost during the interim period. W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE
53 (1968) [hereinafter cited as WHYTE].
80. See, e.g., Gait v. County of Cook, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 (1950).
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Compensable Regulations
One method that has been suggested as a way of surmounting
charges that a conservation zoning ordinance results in a "taking" of
private property without just compensation or is an overly restrictive
police power regulation is the use of compensable regulations. Under
such a scheme, the owners of property in designated open space dis-
tricts may use their land only for certain compatible purposes, such as a
park or nature preserve, and are prohibited from constructing houses,
apartment buildings, or commercial structures.
For the loss suffered by landowners because of the reduction of
their properties' development potential, they are compensated by the
municipality either by cash payments or by the ability to sell or transfer
their excess development rights. The concept of transferable develop-
ment rights has been applied mainly in the area of historic landmark
preservation, 81 but there seems to be no reason why it could not also be
utilized to maintain open space in the cities and suburbs.
82
Several different TDR schemes have been developed,8 3 but one-
the Chicago plan--deserves particular note here. This plan was
originated as a means of preserving Chicago's historic landmark build-
ings,84 and the Illinois General Assembly revised the state's preserva-
tion enabling act in 1971 to allow local governments to implement the
plan.85 A city adopting a preservation program based on the Chicago
plan could begin by designating "development rights transfer districts."
These could be of two types: transferor districts, which would include
the areas in which the landmarks or open space was concentrated, and
transferee districts, which might be the same areas as the transferor
districts or which might take in alternative developable areas. When a
particular parcel is denominated a landmark or open space parcel, its
owner could transfer the development rights to lots within the trans-
feree districts and receive a lower tax assessment, reflecting the reduced
value of the property. At the time of the transfer, the owner would be
required to execute a "preservation restriction" in favor of the city.
81. Transferable development rights are hereinafter referred to as TDR. New York City and
Chicago in particular have developed TDR programs for landmark preservation. See generally
Rose, The Transfer of Development Rights. A Preview of an Evolving Concept, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J.
330, 337-38 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rose].
82. Id See also Comment, Urban Park Preservation Through Transferable Development
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
637 (1977).
83. Rose, supra note 81, at 337-38.
84. For a description of the evolution and content of the Chicago plan, see J. COSTONIS,
SPACE ADRIFT 28-64 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SPACE ADRIFT].
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-48.2-1 (1977).
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This restriction would prohibit any further development of the trans-
feror parcel and require the present and successive owners to maintain
the property in its current condition.
An owner who chose not to participate voluntarily in the transfer
program but instead to develop his property would force the city to
condemn a preservation restriction and the property's associated devel-
opment rights. The city would have to pay the owner just compensa-
tion for the rights thus acquired. These development rights would be
placed in a municipal "development rights bank" along with develop-
ment rights donated by private owners of landmarks or open land and
those transferred from publicly owned sites. To fund its acquisition of
development rights through the use of eminent domain, the city could
sell the rights in the development rights bank to property owners desir-
ing to build structures that would otherwise be in violation of zoning
ordinances. Even with these extra development rights, developers
would still have to comply with certain bulk limitations and planning
controls.
Although the Chicago plan was designed to preserve landmark
buildings, it could be used also to save open areas adjacent to urban
streams. Its principal advantage over conventional zoning is that it is
fairer to individual landowners whose land is placed in a conservation
district. It is more likely to survive constitutional challenges because it
provides for compensation either through cash payments or through
the ability to transfer and presumably to sell excess development rights.
Moreover, this scheme is specifically authorized by the Illinois Histori-
cal Preservation Enabling Act, which is directed at the preservation not
only of landmark buildings but also of any area or place "having spe-
cial historical, community, or aesthetic interest or value."
8' 6
Although the Chicago plan and other TDR programs may have
certain advantages over conventional zoning, they, too, pose a number
of potential problems. For instance, they are subject to attack on sev-
eral legal grounds of their own, different from those presented by an
overly restrictive zoning ordinance.87 Moreover, because landmark
sites and open space areas are often worth more as part of a larger tract
of land than in isolation, the city that delayed acquisition of a preserva-
86. Id (emphasis added).
87. For a full discussion of the legal issues presented by compensable zoning regulations, see
Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381,
appeal disrmissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Pres-
ervation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 602-34 (1972). See also SPACE ADRIF-r,
supra note 84, at 145-66; Costonis, Development Rights Transfer" An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75 (1973).
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tion restriction on a particular site might discover later that it did not
have enough funds in development rights bank to cover the inflated
cost of acquisition. 88 Further, because TDR schemes require a rather
extensive administrative framework at the local level, they are more
complex and more costly to implement and enforce than a conven-
tional zoning ordinance. 89
Subdivision Regulation
Another type of land use control maintained pursuant to the police
power is subdivision regulation. Under Illinois law, municipalities and
counties may require that a developer who desires to subdivide his
property submit a plan of the proposed subdivision to the local govern-
mental body for approval.90 As a prerequisite to approval, the munici-
pality is authorized to compel the developer to dedicate a certain
portion of his land for school and park sites, or to pay a fee in lieu of
dedicating land.9'
In the past, subdivision exactions tended to be disapproved by Illi-
nois courts, particularly where the city appeared to be trying to obtain
land for schools or parks to serve the entire community, rather than
only the residents of the new subdivision.92 In several cases, the courts
struck down ordinances that required "excessive" dedications as consti-
tuting a taking of property without payment of just compensation.93
After the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Krughoff v. City of
Naperville,94 however, Illinois courts should be more liberal in uphold-
ing subdivision exaction ordinances. In Krughoff, the court sustained a
Naperville ordinance requiring a subdivider to contribute land, or
money in lieu of land, for park and school sites. Because the ordinance
geared the amount of land to be dedicated to the number of people
brought into the area by the new subdivision,95 the court said that the
88. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 84, at 186-87.
89. Id at 185.
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-12-7, 11-12-12 (1977) (municipalities); id ch. 34, § 414
(counties).
91. Id See Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 41 11. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff'd,
68 11. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
92. Eg., Illinois ex rel Exchange Nat'l Bank v. City of Lake Forest, 40 I11. 2d 281, 239
N.E.2d 819 (1968); Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176
N.E.2d 799 (1961); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 I11. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
93. Id
94. 68 III. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
95. The Naperville ordinance requires, as a prerequisite to plat approval, that the subdivider
dedicate 5.5 acres of land for recreational areas for every 1,000 of ultimate population in the
proposed development. This amount may be reduced to the extent that the developer provided
for private recreational facilities within the subdivision. A table included in the ordinance esti-
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ordinance met the requirement established in earlier cases that the ded-
ication be proportioned to needs "uniquely attributable" to the devel-
oper's activities.96 Thus, a carefully drafted ordinance providing for
the dedication of only the amount of land for recreational and educa-
tional facilities necessitated by the additional subdivision should sur-
vive a constitutional challenge in Illinois courts.
97
Like zoning, subdivision regulation has the advantage of being an
inexpensive open space preservation device. Although developers may
be likely to dedicate the portion of their property least suitable for de-
velopment, this practice may benefit the municipality in that the prop-
erty along streams, while unsuitable for buildings, is the most desirable
as open space. Unlike zoning, subdivision exactions have the advan-
tage of actually opening up the land to public recreational use whereas
conservation zoning in most cases can only preserve the scenic features
and restrict the development of land adjacent to a waterway. On the
other hand, subdivision ordinances have limited usefulness since they
can preserve only as much land as property owners decide to subdivide
and develop for residential purposes. If a landowner decides to build
an apartment house on a parcel of riverfront property without subdi-
viding it, he may do so without complying with subdivision require-
ments. Moreover, if a developer were to subdivide his property but
develop it for commercial purposes, he presumbly would not need to
dedicate any land for park or school sites since no new demand on the
existing parks and schools would be created directly by the new subdi-
vision.
ACQUISITION
In general, acquisition is preferred to regulation as a means of sav-
ing open space. 98 It provides local governments with complete and per-
manent control over open lands. It is not subject to the continual
political pressures that a zoning ordinance is, and thus once land is
mates the number of individuals and the age distribution of children who might be expected to
live in various types of housing units. The developer, if he disagrees with the estimated popula-
tion as determined by the table, may submit his own demographic study. Krughoff v. City of
Naperville, 41 11. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976).
96. Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977). The court thus
found that Naperville had statutory authority to enact a subdivision ordinance both within its
corporate limits and within one and one-half miles of them. The court never reached the question
of whether the city had authority under its home rule powers to enact subdivision regulations.
97. The ordinance drafters will need to ascertain how much recreational land is reasonably
required for each individual or each family. See, e.g., note 95 supra.
98. WHYrE, supra note 79, at 54; Note, Park Planning and the 4cquisition of Open Spaces.- A
Case Study, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 642, 663-64 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Park Planning].
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acquired by a local government, it is likely to remain in public use for
an indefinite period. Moreover, land that is acquired can be improved
for public recreational purposes, and public access to waterways can be
provided. Zoning regulations by themselves only restrict development
so that the public can enjoy the scenic view along the riverfront. By the
same token, subdivision regulations can provide access to riverfront
property only where the owner decides to subdivide his land for resi-
dential development and thus are less useful in developed urban areas.
Acquisition, however, has the disadvantage of being more costly
than regulation, even where the local government does not purchase or
condemn the entire fee simple. Furthermore, funding for open space
acquisition is often difficult to obtain,99 and many local governments,
although ostensibly committed to an urban stream or other open space
project, often accord other programs such as crime control and public
housing a higher fiscal priority.10°
A governmental body may acquire land by purchase, by condem-
nation, and by donation. 0 1 In addition, it may seek to obtain the entire
fee simple in the property or some lesser interest.
Purchases
Municipalities and other local governments in Illinois are empow-
ered to acquire and hold real property for general governmental pur-
poses and for certain specified purposes, including recreational uses.10 2
Moreover, Illinois has a statute that authorizes the Illinois Department
of Conservation10 3 to provide financial assistance to local governments
for the acquisition of open space lands.'°4 This statute does not specifi-
cally empower units of local government to purchase open space prop-
erty. However, when read in light of the other statutes authorizing
local governments to acquire lands for recreational and scenic pur-
poses, it indicates that the legislature contemplated that local govern-
99. It is sometimes possible for local governments to obtain federal and state financial assist-
ance for conservation and park projects. See generally BUREAU OF OUTDOOR RECREATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, DIGEST: FEDERAL OUTDOOR RECREATION
PROGRAMS AND RECREATION-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS (1973); J. ANDRESEN, Di-
RECTORY OF ILLINOIS FORESTRY AND CONSERVATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (1972).
100. Wagenlander, Urban Open Space Game, 6 URBAN LAW. 950, 954 (1974).
101. Donation is discussed in the next section. See text accompanying notes 139-49 infra.
102. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-95-1 (1977) (municipalities).
103. The Illinois Department of Conservation also is authorized to purchase property for the
purpose of developing recreational areas and preserving scenic areas. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127,
§§63a, 18-19 (1977).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2103 (1977).
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ments would be preserving open lands within their jurisdictions. 105
Although outright purchase of the fee simple in property adjacent
to an urban waterway may be the simplest method of acquiring the
land and may provide the most nearly complete form of control over
the property, several variations of this method offer other advantages.
Installment buying allows the local government to spread payments
over a number of years while the land remains undeveloped.106 The
municipality, county, or special district need not expend at one time a
large sum of money, which is often impossible to raise, and can agree
with the landowner on a purchase price before development pressures
have inflated the land's value. The landowner has the advantage of
spreading his capital gains over a number of years and thus reducing
his income tax liability.'0 7 His property tax liability also may be de-
creased if the city takes title to the land at the time of the initial agree-
ment. Moreover, depending upon his agreement with the municipality,
he may be able to stay on the land until the full purchase price has been
paid. If he does so, the city is relieved of maintenance obligations.
Pre-emptive buying involves the purchase of a few strategically lo-
cated parcels in a large tract of land. 0 8 The local government that can-
not afford to buy the entire tract may be able to appropriate enough
funds to acquire some portion of the property. By carefully selecting
the parcels to be purchased, the local government can thwart the plans
of developers to build on the remaining property, particularly property
along a riverfront that is likely to require filling and flood prevention
measures. Because the developer must go to added expense to protect
from flooding all the parcels in the tract, including the ones owned by
the government, he may not find it profitable to develop the land that
he owns.
A third variation of the outright purchase consists of purchases by
the local governmental body concurrent with the resale, leaseback, or
105. Moreover, home rule units of government may exercise any power pertaining to their
government and affairs. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(a). This would presumably include the purchase
of open lands along an urban waterway for local recreational purposes, unless the waterway were
a major regional or state river under the supervision of the Illinois Department of Transportation
or the Illinois Department of Conservation.
106. Park Planning, supra note 98, at 649-50.
107. For a thorough discussion of the tax consequences of various open space preservation
techniques, see Thomas, Transfers of Land to the Stalefor Conservation Purposes- Methods, Guar-
antees, and Tax Analsisfor Prospective Donors, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 545 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Thomas]. The income tax consequences of installment buying are discussed. Id at 560.
108. WHYTE, supra note 79, at 69-70.
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reservation of a life estate in the original owner. 0 9 Under any one of
these approaches, the local government must outlay the entire cost of
the fee (or the fee encumbered with a life tenancy) initially, although
part of this outlay is recouped through the proceeds of a resale to the
original owner or through rental payments. Rental payments, in par-
ticular, may be employed to establish a revolving fund for purchase of
additional open space or for repayment of bonds used to finance the
original acquisition. Restrictions in the deed or rental agreement for-
bid the owner to develop his land in a manner that would destroy its
scenic and recreational value. Since none of these schemes allows im-
mediate public access to the land, they are best used when there is no
pressing need for the property as a recreational site. The governmental
agency gains the assurance, however, that the land will be available at
the end of the life tenancy or the lease, and, at the same time, the gov-
ernment avoids the responsibility of maintaining the property.
Because fee purchase is frequently expensive, local governments
interested in preserving open lands bordering an urban stream may
prefer to acquire less-than-fee interests in these lands. Less-than-fee
interests can include easements, leaseholds, and licenses. Easements
can be either positive or negative. An affirmative easement grants to
the holder certain positive rights with respect to the landowner's prop-
erty-for example, the right to enter the property for recreational pur-
poses or the right to require the landowner to maintain the property in
a certain condition. Negative easements, on the other hand, prohibit
the landowner from doing certain things with his property. For in-
stance, under a negative easement, a landowner may relinquish the
right to use the property for commercial or industrial purposes or to
make a more intensive use of it. Conservation easements, which are
directed towards resources and wildlife protection, and scenic ease-
ments, which are used to preserve the beauty of an area, are usually
couched as negative easements. 0 A leasehold is an agreement be-
tween the landowner and the public agency under which the owner
rents his property to the agency for a specified period of time."'I The
agency pays an agreed upon sum annually and in return gains access to
the property for the public and a promise from the owner not to alter
his land during the period of public occupancy. A license allows the
109. LAND USE, supra note 21, at 37; WHYTE, supra note 79, at 65-68; Thomas, supra note 107,
at 562; Park Planning, supra note 98, at 648-49.
110. Comment, Easements to Preserve Open Space Land, I ECOLOGY L.Q. 728, 735-37 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Easements].
111. LAND USE, supra note 21, at 40-41.
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public to enter the owner's land and may be cheaper than an easement
or a leasehold. However, it is less permanent than the other interests in
that a landowner usually may cancel a license at any time.
1 2
There are several advantages both to the public and to the land-
owner where the governmental unit buys less than the entire fee sim-
ple. 1 3 The cost of an easement is usually considerably less than that of
the entire fee. Moreover, the encumbered land remains on the tax rolls,
although at a reduced assessed valuation, and the property owner bears
the expense of upkeep. Further, property burdened with a negative
easement will make fewer demands on community services such as
sewers, schools, and police and fire protection. The landowner in turn
enjoys the advantage of being able to stay on the land and possibly to
make a productive use of it. In addition, he may receive a preferential
property tax assessment reflecting the reduced value of his interest. If
the landowner owns additional parcels nearby, he may find that their
value is increased by their proximity to a scenic or recreational area.
Easements, despite their advantages, can pose problems for a local
government that tries to focus its urban stream project on acquisition of
riverfront easements. If the land along the river is under intense devel-
opment pressure, the cost of the easement may approach or almost
equal the cost of the entire fee.' 14 Furthermore, if the terms of the
easement are not precise and clearly understood by the landowner, ex-
pensive and time-consuming renegotiation or litigation may result in
the future.1 5 Finally, it is uncertain in Illinois whether, in the absence
of an express legislative grant, local governmental bodies have the au-
thority to purchase and hold less-than-fee interests and to construct im-
provements on land to which they do not have the full fee title."
6
Local governments may overcome these disadvantages, however, by
anticipating development pressures on riverfront land, by carefully
drafting any easement agreements, and by lobbying for state legislation
specifically authorizing local governments to purchase, condemn, hold,
and improve less-than-fee interests. The quest for state legislation may
112. Id at 41.
113. Weissburg, Legal Alternatives to the Police Power: Condemnation, Purchase, Development
Rights, Gifts, in OPEN SPACE AND THE LAW 41 (F. Herring ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Weiss-
burg]; Moore, supra note 32, at 281-84; Easements, supra note 110, at 735-37.
114. Herring, supra note 33, at 107.
115. Easements, supra note 110, at 737.
116. See R. Osmundsen, The Legal Environment of Coastal Zone Management Planning in
Illinois 48-59 (1975) (University of Illinois College of Law unpublished report) in which the au-
thor notes that although the departments of conservation and transportation have authority to
acquire less-than-fee interests in property, they may not be authorized to construct any improve-
ments on property to which they do not hold the fee title.
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be much more difficult than the other two steps if the Illinois General
Assembly fears that local governments would use the enabling statute
to increase excessively expenditures for open space purchases. Local
governments must stress to state legislators that nothing in the present
law prohibits local governments from purchasing easements. In addi-
tion, the ability to purchase easements will not necessarily increase ex-
penditures for open space preservation and acquisition but merely
allow local governments to use the available funds over a wider land
area. Easements in many riverfront parcels could be purchased rather
than fee interests in a few tracts.
A number of states have made easement acquisition a part of, if
not the major portion of, their open space preservation programs.' 17 In
Illinois, local governments might want to consider purchasing ease-
ments in riverfront property as an interim measure before purchase of
the fee or as a permanent scheme where intensive public use is not
anticipated.
Condemnation
A municipality or other local government that has commenced an
urban river beautification project may discover that landowners along
the riverfront are unwilling to sell their property to the public agency or
that even if they are willing to sell a price cannot be agreed upon. In
that case, the city will be forced to use its power of eminent domain to
acquire the property.
Municipalities and other local governments have the power to con-
demn land for public purposes so long as just compensation is paid to
the owner. 118 Municipalities, 119 park districts, 120 and other units of lo-
cal government12 1 are authorized specifically to acquire land for recrea-
tional purposes. Condemnation of riverfront property to provide a
park, a conservation area, or even merely a scenic view would un-
doubtedly be considered a valid public purpose. 22 The only anxiety
117. See, e.g., ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DIVISION OF WATERWAYS, AN-
NUAL REPORT 41-46 (1973); Note, Progress and Problems in Wisconsin's Scenic and Conservation
Easement Program, 1965 WiS. L. REV. 352.
118. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47, § 1 (1977); id. ch. 24, § 11-16-1.
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-95-1 (1977). See Village of Deerfield v. Rapka, 54 InI. 2d
217, 296 N.E.2d 366 (1973) (village held to have power to condemn land beyond village limits for
playground even though statute did not expressly state that acquisition could be by eminent do-
main).
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, §§ 8-1(b), 8-10 (1977).
121. Eg., id. ch. 42, §§ 393, 394(c) (river conservancy district); id. ch. 96 1/2, § 6342 (forest
preserve district).
122. See, e.g., Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850
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that a municipality or other local government should have regarding
the condemnation of riverfront land is related to the price set at the
condemnation proceeding. 23 In determining the fair cash market
value of the property taken, 24 one evaluates the property's highest and
best use.' 25 The highest and best use constitutes the most profitable use
to which the land can reasonably be adapted,126 and evidence may be
presented as to the probability of rezoning the property to allow a
higher use. 127 Thus, although parcels along a stream may currently be
zoned as open space or for single family residences on large lots, in-
tense development pressure may make rezoning to multifamily residen-
tial or commercial classification extremely probable. As a result, the
condemning agency will be forced to pay a premium price for the prop-
erty. On the other hand, if the city can show that it has an open space
plan which designates the condemnee's land for park purposes, it can
counter the assertion that a rezoning to a higher use was likely. At the
same time, the city is probably precluded from down-zoning the prop-
erty for the purpose of lowering the condemnation award even further.
Like purchase, condemnation affords the local government perma-
nent and complete control over the property taken. It, too, however, is
an expensive method of acquiring and preserving park lands near a
watercourse. 28 Moreover, condemnation proceedings are time-con-
suming and costly and often produce adverse reactions among land-
owners whose property is being condemned. 29 Since a local
government that undertakes a stream restoration project will want to
secure the approval of as many local residents as possible, 130 it should
(1961) (condemnation of land for park purposes held a legitimate municipal function); Forest
Preserve Dist. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 351 I11. 48, 183 N.E. 819 (1932) (condemnation of
land for road leading to forest preserve held a valid public purpose). See also Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
123. Under Illinois law, just compensation has come to mean the fair cash market value of the
condemned land. F. RIGHEIMER & F. RIGHEIMER, JR., EMINENT DOMAIN IN ILLINOIS § 5.041 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as RIGHEIMER]; Note, Eminent Domain: Property Valuation, 1973 ILL.
L.F. 449. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47, § 9.7 (1977).
124. The fair cash market value of the property is said to constitute the price that a willing
buyer would pay for the property to a willing seller. Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v.
Oberlaender, 42 I11. 2d 410, 247 N.E.2d 888 (1969).
125. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles, 24 Ill. 2d 520, 182 N.E.2d 169 (1962); Illinois
Cities Water Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 11 Ill. 2d 547, 144 N.E.2d 729 (1957).
126. Morton Grove Park Dist. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 39 I11. App. 3d 426, 350
N.E.2d 149 (1976). RIGHEIMER, supra note 123, at § 5.048.
127. Id § 5.031.
128. Schroeder, 5upra note 32, at 355.
129. LAND USE, supra note 21, at 38-39; Park Planning, supra note 98, at 652-53.
130. It is often the enthusiasm of local citizens which sparks local governmental efforts to
pursue an urban stream project. For example, in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, the Champaign
County Bicentennial Commission sponsored a three month campaign in 1976 to raise $30,000 for
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
attempt to negotiate sales or to encourage donations' 3' of property
before resorting to eminent domain. The threat of condemnation, on
the other hand, may add teeth to an open space acquisition program
and enable municipal authorities to negotiate a reasonable purchase
price with owners of land adjacent to a stream.
32
As was discussed earlier in regard to purchase of open lands, 133 the
condemnation of an easement in riverfront property, rather than the
entire fee, may lower the high cost of acquiring such property. 34 The
easement in the public could allow public access to the stream, could
prohibit the owner from developing his property, or could require the
owner to maintain the scenic qualities of his parcel. The condemnation
of conservation or scenic easements has been upheld in a number of
states, 35 but in Illinois there is no express grant of authority to munici-
palities, counties, or park districts to condemn a less-than-fee inter-
est.' 36 Such power may be inferred, however, from Illinois case law.
137
DONATION, DEDICATION, AND PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS
Zoning, subdivision exactions, purchase, and condemnation are
government-initiated methods of acquiring scenic and recreational ar-
eas adjacent to urban waterways. In addition to these methods, local
governments implementing a plan for stream restoration should be
aware of several techniques for open space preservation that originate
in the private sector. Donations and dedications usually involve inten-
tional gifts of land by private owners to public agencies or nonprofit
conservation organizations. Prescriptive rights are commonly acquired
a master plan to restore and beautify a local stream, Boneyard Creek. The campaign was success-
ful, and the necessary funds were raised. Planning and land acquisition are now proceeding at a
steady, if slow, pace. For an account of the Bicentennial Boneyard Creek campaign, see issues of
the Champaign-Urbana News Gazette, April 4, 1976 through July 15, 1976. During that period,
articles appeared daily urging donations of land and/or money in support of the "Our Boneyard"
project.
131. See text accompanying notes 139-49 infra.
132. Park Planning, supra note 98, at 653.
133. See text accompanying notes 94-101 supra.
134. Herring, supra note 33, at 108; Comment, Legal Methods of Historic Preservation, 19
BUFFALO L. REV. 611, 621-22 (1970).
135. E.g., Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
136. The Illinois courts strictly construe statutes granting eminent domain power to govern-
mental bodies, and thus without an express statutory authorization to condemn less-than-fee inter-
ests, the courts might invalidate a local government's attempt to acquire an easement. See
RIGHEIMER, supra note 123, at § 1.03.
137. See Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles, 24 Ill. 2d 520, 182 N.E.2d 169 (1962); City
of Waukegan v. Stanczak, 6 Ill. 2d 594, 604, 129 N.E.2d 751, 757 (1975); Miller v. Commissioners
of Lincoln Park, 278 111. 400, 406, 116 N.E. 178, 181 (1917). These cases imply that in exercising
its power of eminent domain, a public agency should not take any larger interest in a piece of
property than is necessitated by the public purpose for which it is being taken.
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by the public through the inadvertence or neglect of the landowner.
Although governmental bodies cannot force gifts from private property
owners, they can make owners more aware of the advantages of dona-
tion and dedication and, in fact, can embark on carefully planned pro-
grams to encourage gifts. 138 They can also investigate whether the
public has any prescriptive easements over land bordering their city's
waterways. These methods, if properly fostered, can save local govern-
ments the expense of purchase or condemnation and the legal problems
often accompanying overly restrictive zoning or subdivision regula-
tions.
Donation
A landowner of riverfront property who desires to see his land
used for conservation or recreational purposes might be willing to do-
nate some or all of it to a local governmental body. The donative urge
will probably be stronger before development pressure has begun, and
thus it is important for local governments to seek out prospective do-
nors while low-intensity uses are still the only ones contemplated by the
owners.
Donation can be accomplished by a variety of means: outright gift
of the fee simple; donation of a conservation or recreational easement;
donation with the reservation of a life estate; and grant of the fee sim-
ple but with a provision for reverter if the property is not maintained
according to the donor's wishes. The gift may be made either by a
grant during the donor's life or a transfer in trust to a trustee charged
with the responsibility of seeing that the property is used for the do-
nor's intended purposes 139 or by a testamentary transfer. The recipient
of the gift may be a public agency such as a municipality, county, or
park district; a private nonprofit corporation dedicated to conservation
of open lands, such as the Nature Conservancy; 40 or, a community
land trust. 141
A gift or bequest of property to a public body or charitable organi-
zation can benefit the owner in a number of ways, particularly with
138. For descriptions of programs to encourage donations of land for conservation purposes,
see WHYTE, supra note 79, at 72-77; MARYLAND ENVIRONMENTAL TRUST, CONSERVATION EASE-
MENTS (1974).
139. Thomas, supra note 107, at 564-73.
140. Many of these organizations purchase land and then resell it at cost to government agen-
cies when public funds become available. C. LrTLE, CHALLENGE OF THE LAND 59 (1969); Her-
ring, supra note 33, at 123-24.
141. Thomas, supra note 107, at 578.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
respect to taxes.142 The owner's real estate tax assessment is reduced to
the extent that the value of his interest in the property is diminished. 43
He is also exempt from federal gift tax liability if the donation is made
to a governmental unit or charitable organization. 144 In addition, when
figuring his federal income taxes, the owner may claim a charitable
contribution deduction from his adjusted gross income equal to the fair
market value of the donated land. 45 Furthermore, if he devises the
property instead of making an inter vivos gift, considerable federal es-
tate tax savings may be realized.146 Additional, nontax advantages are
that the owner no longer has the expense of maintaining the property
and he has the satisfaction of knowing that he has contributed to the
visual and recreational amenities of his community. The local govern-
ment reaps the benefit of obtaining open or recreational lands at mini-
mal cost.
Despite these advantages, individual landowners are often reluc-
tant to donate their land. Some may fear that even with restrictive cov-
enants in the deed the government body will not use the land as they
intended. 147 If donors are made aware of the various safeguards avail-
able, 48 some of these fears may be alleviated. Other factors mitigating
against large-scale donations are landowners' ignorance of the advan-
tages of making gifts of their land and the lack of effort by state and
local governments, with the assistance of conservation groups, to in-
form riverfront property owners of the benefits of land donation. A
local government considering development of such a program might
142. See generally Thomas, supra note 107, at 545-86; Latcham & Findley, The Influence of
Taxation and Assessment Policies on Open Space, in OPEN SPACE AND THE LAW 55-72 (1965).
143. "In the assessment of real estate encumbered by public easement, any depreciation occa-
sioned by such easement shall be deducted in the valuation of such property." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
120, § 501(5) (1977).
144. I.R.C. § 2522(a).
145. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (c)(1). After passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Tax
Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, a taxpayer may deduct as a charitable contribution the
gift of a partial interest in land, namely a lease, option to purchase, or remainder interest, to a
qualifying organization exclusively for conservation purposes. The taxpayer must make the gift
before June 13, 1981 to claim the deduction. Id § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) & (iv). Conservation purposes
include preservation of lands for public recreational uses or scenic enjoyment. Id § 170(f)(3)(C).
Under an earlier treasury regulation, one can claim a charitable contribution deduction for the gift
of an open space easement in gross in perpetuity. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(b)(1)(ii) (1975).
146. I.R.C. § 2055(a); Thomas, supra note 107, at 555.
147. See Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 120 N.E.2d 15 (1954); Weissburg, supra note
113, at 48.
148. For example, the donor can give the property through an intermediary organization such
as a conservation group. The deed can specify that if the government body that receives the
donation ever uses the land for purposes contrary to those stipulated by the donor, then the land
reverts to the intermediary organization. See Thomas, supra note 107, at 583-86.
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study similar programs in other jurisdictions. 49
Dedication
Similar to donation in its purpose, dedication is generally defined
as the gift or appropriation of private property to the public for a public
purpose.' 50 It can be accomplished either by complying with the statu-
tory requirements for dedication' 5' or by fulfilling the common law
requisites. 5 2 Statutory dedication passes, the title to the fee to the city
as grantee, which holds the title in trust for the public, whereas under a
common law dedication title remains in the grantor subject to an ease-
ment in the public to use the land for certain purposes.
153
To achieve a statutory dedication, the landowner must strictly
comply with the plats statute. 54 The statute requires an owner who
plans to subdivide his property into parcels any one of which is less
than five acres to have his property surveyed and platted by a regis-
tered land surveyor. 55 The plat must show, among other things, all
public streets, parks, and other public grounds within the subdivi-
sion.-56 The owner must file the plat with the proper unit of local gov-
ernment, 57 and the acknowledgement and recording of the plat by the
governmental body vests it with fee simple title of all the portions dedi-
cated to the public on the plat.. 58 Once the land has been dedicated,
the owner cannot revoke the dedication, except upon vacating the plat
in accordance with the statute. 59 Approval of the city or county to
which the title had passed is required for revocation in all cases.
160
Even if the city claims unsuccessfully that certain property was
dedicated to the public according to statute, the court may still find a
common law dedication. A common law dedication may encompass a
149. See Herring, supra note 33, at 123.
150. DuPont v. Miller, 310 I11. 140, 141 N.E. 423 (1923); Note, Public Recreation on Nonnaviga-
ble Lakes and the Doctrine ofReasonable Use, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1064, 1068-69 (1970).
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, § 3 (1977).
152. Woodward v. Schultz, 15 I11. 2d 476, 155 N.E.2d 568 (1959).
153. Id at 482, 155 N.E.2d at 572. See Sears v. City of Chicago, 247 IUl. 204, 93 N.E. 158
(1910).
154. Road King Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Village of Wood Dale, 23 111. App. 3d 181, 184, 318
N.E.2d 710, 712 (1974). See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 109, §§ 1, 3 (1977).
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, §§ 1, 3 (1977).
156. Id § 1.
157. If the property lies within an incorporated village or city, the owner must file his plat with
the municipality. If it lies within an unincorporated area, he must file the plat with the appropri-
ate county. Id § 2.
158. Id § 3.
159. Id §§ 6, 7.
160. Shoreline Builders Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 60 11. App. 2d 282, 209 N.E.2d 878 (1965).
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variety of purposes, including recreational lands. 16 1 Most Illinois
courts have held that three requisites must be met in order for a com-
mon law dedication to be found: an intention on the part of the owner
to dedicate the property to the public for public purposes; an accept-
ance of the offer to dedicate by the public; and clear, satisfactory, and
unequivocal proof as to the offer of dedication and the acceptance.
62
The intention to dedicate may be shown by various acts and declara-
tions of the owner. 163 These statements and declarations must show an
active intent on the part of the owner to dedicate the property; a mere
nonassertion of his right of ownership is insufficient to prove the neces-
sary intention.164 Similarly, proof of acceptance requires some showing
of affirmative actions indicating an acceptance by the public, such as
active use by the public of the land, removal of the property from the
tax rolls, and repair and maintenance of the property by the municipal
authorities. 165
A common law dedication takes effect upon acceptance by the
public 166 and is binding upon subsequent grantees of the original own-
er.' 67 Moreover, a common law dedication does not require a specific
grantee such as a city or other governmental body; the public itself suf-
fices as a recipient of the dedication. 68 Because of these rules, without
knowing it, the public in some municipalities and counties may have
access to the local waterways by virtue of a common law dedication.
Further, if the city did not open up the area dedicated to public use
upon a plat immediately after the plat was filed, there may exist statu-
torily dedicated recreational areas of which a local community is una-
ware. Hence, before proceeding with purchase or condemnation of
161. See City of Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 IIl. 587, 589 (1877).
162. E.g., City of Princeton v. Gustavson, 241 Ill. 566, 569-70, 89 N.E. 653, 655 (1909); De-
partment of Transp. v. Thomas, 59 Ill. App. 3d 684, 689, 375 N.E.2d 834, 835 (1978); Puszkiewicz
v. Friedlander, 12 IIl. App. 3d 1017, 1023-24, 299 N.E.2d 400, 405 (1973); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v.
Village of Harwood Heights, 2 Il. App. 3d 1040, 1050, 278 N.E.2d 114, 120 (1972).
163. See, e.g., DuPont v. Miller, 310 Ill. 140, 147-48, 141 N.E. 423, 426 (1923) (public use of
waterway for over forty years with owner's knowledge; owner's failure to pay taxes on land under-
lying waterway; passage of ordinances making waterway part of Chicago harbor); Moffett v.
South Park Comm'rs, 138 Ill. 620, 624-26, 28 N.E. 975, 977 (1891) (previous owner built fence
thirty-three feet north of south property line).
164. Leonard v. Pearce, 348 111. 518, 526, 181 N.E. 399, 401 (1932); Palmer v. City of Chicago,
248 Ill. 201, 210, 93 N.E. 765, 768 (1910).
165. Town of Bethel v. Pruett, 215 Il. 162, 170, 74 N.E. 111, 114 (1905); Eisendrath & Co. v.
City of Chicago, 192 11. 320, 326,61 N.E. 419, 421 (1901); Rees v. City of Chicago, 38 11. 322, 336
(1865); In re Application of County Collector, 44 I11. App. 3d 327, 330, 357 N.E.2d 1302, 1303
(1976).
166. Palmer v. City of Chicago, 248 I11. 201, 210, 93 N.E. 765, 768 (1910).
167. Moffett v. South Park Comm'rs, 138 I.. 620, 626-27, 28 N.E. 975, 977 (1891).
168. Nelson v. Randolph, 222 Ill. 531, 538, 78 N.E. 914, 917 (1906).
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access rights and riverfront property, a local government involved in an
urban stream project should investigate whether any lands along the
river have been dedicated to the public. If it is discovered that property
has been dedicated, the public authorities should attempt to find out
whether any conditions or limitations were attached to the grant since
use of the property in violation of the original grantor's limitations
could result in revocation of the dedication.
69
Like donated parcels, dedicated land is removed from the real es-
tate tax rolls and the burdens of maintaining the property are placed
upon the local government. 70 It might be noted in passing, however,
that a common law dedication creates only a perpetual easement on
behalf of the public and theoretically does not grant fee title to the city
or other public body. 17' The fee title remains with the original owner
and his subsequent grantees. The practical utility of owning the fee
title is rather minimal since possession and control of the land usually
resides with the municipality or other local governmental unit. There
remains, of course, the possibility that at some time the city might
abandon possession of the land, at which time the easement would re-
vert to the fee owner.1
72
Prescriptive Rights
In addition to encouraging donations and dedications of land ad-
jacent to urban waterways, local governments should explore to what
extent the public has acquired any prescriptive rights with respect to
riverfront property. The public's right to use navigable waters for fish-
ing, swimming, and boating cannot be enjoyed unless members of the
public can gain lawful access to the stream. Acquisition of a prescrip-
tive easement across land adjacent to the waterway is a low cost means
by which the public can obtain such access.
A prescriptive easement over an owner's property entitles the
holder of the easement to cross the property on a specific path. 73 The
easement holder may be a specified private individual, who has used
169. Sundstrom v. Village of Oak Park, 374 Ill. 632, 638-39, 30 N.E.2d 58, 62 (1940).
170. In re Application of County Collector, 44 Ill. App. 3d 327, 331-32, 357 N.E.2d 1302, 1303
(1976).
171. Woodward v. Schultz, 15 II. 2d 476, 478, 155 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1959); In re Application
of County Collector, 44 Ill. App. 3d 327, 331, 357 N.E.2d 1302, 1303 (1976).
172. Although an easement does not normally confer the right to possession but only the right
to use the land, the type of easement created under a common law dedication is a curious hybrid
and apparently affords the easement holder both rights. The fee owner retains only a possibility of
reverter. In re Application of County Collector, 44 Ill. App. 3d 327, 332, 357 N.E.2d 1302, 1303
(1976).
173. Town of Bethel v. Pruett, 215 Ill. 162, 74 N.E. III (1905).
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the path in the required way for the specified period, or the easement
may reside in the public generally where unidentified members of the
public have used the right of way. 174 Such a prescriptive right can be
established only by use of the right of way that is open, uninterrupted,
exclusive, and adverse under a claim of right, for a period of twenty
years. 75 The use of the path must also be with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the owner, but not with his permission. 176 If the owner
actively consents to the public's crossing his land, then the public can-
not acquire a prescriptive easement. However, if members of the pub-
lic commonly use a certain pathway under the belief that it is a public
sidewalk or trail, and the owner, although he knows of the trespass,
does nothing, then after the statutory period the public will have ac-
quired a prescriptive right which cannot be taken away by the owner.
If obtaining access to an urban waterway is an important consideration
to a community, local officials should attempt to ascertain whether the
public has acquired any prescriptive easements over land bordering the
river.
CONCLUSION
Among the several open spaces preservation techniques outlined
in this article, none by itself will be sufficient to fulfill the goals of a
local government engaged in an urban stream project. The different
devices may be used in combination, however, to achieve a satisfying
result. Which combination will best serve the needs of the local gov-
ernment will, of course, depend on the type of riverfront uses contem-
plated.
If the project focuses primarily on preserving open, scenic areas
174. See cases involving prescriptive easement in the public to use a private roadway, e.g.,
Armstrong v. Olson, 57 11. App. 3d 223, 372 N.E.2d 114 (1978); Illinois exrel Carson v. Mateyka,
57 I11. App. 3d 991, 373 N.E.2d 471 (1978); King v. Corsini, 32 111. App. 3d 461, 335 N.E.2d 561
(1975). In these cases, the courts examined whether the public use met the statutory standards
under which a private road becomes a public highway. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 2-202 (1977).
To become a public highway, a roadway must be used openly and notoriously in common by all
people for the statutory period of fifteen years. The number of persons using the roadway is not as
determinative as the availability of the road to public use. In other words, the court will consider
whether the members of the public believed that they had a free and unrestricted right to use the
roadway. Van Amburg v. Reynolds, 372 Ill. 317, 322-23, 23 N.E.2d 694, 696-97 (1939).
175. Taylor v. Wentz, 15 I11. 2d 83, 153 N.E.2d 812 (1958); Leesch v. Krause, 393 Il1. 124, 65
N.E.2d 370 (1946); Bontz v. Stear, 285 Il1. 599, 121 N.E. 176 (1918). The twenty-year period
applies to a prescriptive easement established under the common law requirements. If the right of
way qualifies as a public roadway under the statutory requisites, then only a fifteen-year period of
public use must be shown. A highway is defined by the relevant statute as "any public way for
vehicular travel." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 2-202 (1977).
176. Bontz v. Stear, 285 I11. 599, 121 N.E. 176 (1918); Ruck v. Midwest Hunting & Fishing
Club, 104 Ill. App. 2d 185, 243 N.E.2d 834 (1968).
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adjacent to the waterway, the municipality can rely on zoning regula-
tions and acquisition of scenic easements. If public access to the river-
front is not desired, a zoning ordinance placing the riverfront lands in a
conservation district will preserve the undeveloped state of the land.
The ordinance, however, must be carefully drafted to avoid possible
constitutional challenges. For example, it should not deprive the ripa-
rian owners of any reasonable return on their property and thus should
allow residential and commercial uses that are compatible with the
parkway design. If the riverfront parcels are of sufficient depth, the
ordinance might require a strip of several feet along the stream be left
completely open. In addition to or in lieu of allowing certain compati-
ble uses, the conservation zoning scheme could provide for some sort of
compensation to the owners, in the form of transferable development
rights or purchase of development rights with tax funds.' 77 In fact, the
ordinance could be patterned after the New York Historic Preservation
ordinance in allowing landowners to transfer unused development to
nearby parcels. In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in the
Penn Central case, any conservation historic preservation ordinance
that allows landowners some reasonable beneficial use of their property
and permits transfer of development rights where there is a market for
them or the owner also has land in the transfer district should with-
stand challenges on due process and "taking" grounds.
In addition to a riverfront conservation zoning ordinance, dona-
tions of scenic easements can aid in preserving open lands along a wa-
terway. These have many advantages both for the landowner and the
municipality, as was discussed earlier. The owner who was not plan-
ning to sell or develop his land in any event may donate a scenic ease-
ment to a public body or a qualifying nonprofit conservation
organization and thereby reap both property and income tax savings.
The owner may at the same time remain on the property and devise it
to his children, knowing that the riverfront area will remain undevel-
oped. In a community where there is considerable citizen support for
the urban stream project, some owners make donations spontaneously,
without much prodding by the municipality. Generally, however, to
stimulate donations, the municipality or other local government will
177. Suffolk County, New York pioneered a farmlands preservation program in which the
county devised plans to purchase the development rights to 15,000 acres that it wished to keep as
open farmland. Farmers welcomed the program as a means of gaining immediate cash and relief
from high property taxes based on the land's commercial value. Other states such as California
and New Jersey have been studying the Suffolk County program with an eye towards adopting it.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1977, § A, at 1.
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need to organize a campaign to inform the area landowners of the ad-
vantages of scenic easement donations.
If, in addition to preserving open riverfront lands, the local gov-
ernmental units decide to create a linear parkway or at least to provide
public access at numerous places along the waterway, zoning ordi-
nances alone will not suffice. In most cases, it will be impossible to
tailor an ordinance that requires riparian owners essentially to main-
tain a public park along the waterway and at the same time that will
survive constitutional objections. An interim moratorium zoning ordi-
nance, however, that prohibits new development for six or nine months
will allow the local governments to complete planning and obtain
funds for the acquisition of parcels. During and after this interim pe-
riod, the local governments should determine which parcels along the
waterway are best suited for recreational uses. They should then inves-
tigate whether the public has acquired any rights of access in these par-
cels either by dedication or prescription. Owners of these selected
tracts should be approached and donations of part or all of their land
encouraged. The government authorities should suggest that, if an
owner did wish to live on the property during his lifetime, he could
deed the parcel to the city, reserving a life estate in himself.
If donations are not forthcoming, the local governments should be
prepared to purchase the most desirable parcels at the end of the mora-
torium. Because urban land is generally expensive, and funds for open
space/recreational projects in short supply, the planners should con-
sider carefully which tracts are essential to the project. If the landown-
ers are unwilling to sell or a price cannot be negotiated, the
municipality may, of course, condemn the property and pay its fair
cash value.
Part of the waterway may lie in a relatively undeveloped suburban
area. If so, a subdivision exaction ordinance, similar to the Naperville
ordinance, should be enacted to require subdividers to dedicate part of
their land for park purposes. Although the ordinance probably cannot
specify which portion of the land should be dedicated, many develop-
ers will want to give up the riverfront property because of the difficul-
ties of building on the flood plain. The subdivision ordinance, like a
conservation zoning ordinance, must be written so as to withstand legal
objections. In Illinois, even after the decision in the Krughoff case, a
subdivision ordinance cannot require a developer to dedicate land un-
less the need for such land is uniquely attributable to the additional
population brought into the community by the new development.
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Thus, the ordinance should gear the amount of land to be dedicated to
the numbers of new residents in the development.
A mix of regulation, acquisition, and voluntary contributions then
will achieve, in most cases, the desired results in an urban stream resto-
ration project. Each must be used in light of its advantages and limita-
tions, and the open space planner must bear in mind the particular
needs of his community, the availability of funding, the relevant legal
constraints, and the extent of community support for the project. Com-
pletion of a stream project may take many years, but careful planning
and use of the proper legal devices should remove much of the frustra-
tion and delay that often beset such long-term local ventures.

